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This paper evaluates the impact of a widely-used French training programme for youth on earnings. 
This programme is designed to increase labour market experience and education, validated by a 
formal diploma. It is not sure, however, whether this diploma and a similar diploma acquired through 
initial training have the same effect on post-training wages. To answer this question, we contrast the 
2003 net wages of a group of participants enrolled in 1998 (the “treatment” group) to the 2003 net 
wages of a control group. The controls are individuals who completed their initial training in 1998 
with diplomas similar to those obtained by the treated at the end of the programme. Using propensity 
score matching, we find a significantly positive effect of the treatment on the treated: participants in 
the programme benefit, five years after participation, from a positive wage premium. This suggests 
that firms do not simply value education: they value it more if it is coupled with some degree of labour 
market experience. 
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1.  Introduction 
Among the broad literature dedicated to the evaluation of active labour market policies 
in Northern America and in Europe, a large body of work has focused on policies targeting 
unemployed young persons. These policies often take the form of training programmes, 
designed to increase youth labour market experience and human capital, through either on-
the-job training or a mix of on-the-job training and classroom education. Several studies have 
used propensity score matching techniques to estimate the impact of these training 
programmes on subsequent earnings. These studies have yielded mixed results: the impact 
seems to vary hugely not only across countries, but also across programmes. 
In France, training programmes do exist, but there have been very few studies 
dedicated to their evaluation. Existing studies have focused on apprenticeship contracts, i.e. 
specific contacts that generally take place during a young person’s initial training period, and 
involve part-time work in a firm and part-time classroom education. They generally conclude 
that these contracts have no effect on post-training wages.  
In the present study, we focus on another widely-used French training programme for 
youth, the so-called “Qualifying Contract”. This programme targets individuals aged 16-25 
who either do not have any diploma, or are unemployed with a low-level diploma. Using 
original data from two different national surveys,  we estimate the impact of this programme 
on wages five years after enrolment, using propensity score matching techniques. The paper is 
organised as follows: Section 2 gives a brief overview of literature, and states the objective of 
our research, while Section 3 describes the programme we intend to evaluate. Section 4 is  
dedicated to the presentation of our econometric analysis and empirical strategy, while 
Section 5 gives details on the construction of our database. Results are presented and 
commented in Section 6, and conclusion given in a final section. 
2.  Review of the Literature and Objective of The Research  
The evaluation of active labour market programmes for youth has given rise to a very 
large body of literature, in the United States but also in Europe – and especially in northern 
Europe. Among this literature, several papers have been dedicated to the evaluation of 
training programmes, either in terms of employment probabilities or in terms of earnings 
(Smith, 2000). These evaluations have yielded mixed results.  
For instance, Larsson (2003) studies two Swedish training programmes, youth practice 
and labour market training, using propensity score matching. She finds negative short-term 
impacts of both programmes on earnings (one year after the start of the programme), but no 
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found that their impact on post-training earnings (i) was not significantly different from zero 
for new entrants on the labour market, but (ii) was positive and persistent for participants with 
some (recent) labour market experience. According to Hämäläinen and Ollikainen (2004), 
labour market training for youth in Finland increases significantly and persistently the annual 
earnings of the treated.  
Although all of these studies rely on the same methodology (propensity score 
matching), their results are somewhat mixed: training programmes do seem to have an impact, 
but the direction and magnitude of this programme varies according to countries and to the 
targeted population. Therefore, the question of the impact of youth training programmes on 
wages remains an important issue. The objective of this paper is to contribute to a better 
knowledge of this issue, by examing the French case.  
In France, there have been very few studies dedicated to the evaluation of training 
programmes, and, to our knowledge, none using propensity score matching (see Fougère et al., 
2000, for a survey). Existing studies focus on apprenticeship contracts, which is one of the 
two most representative French training programmes. When they occur, these contracts are 
generally part of a young person’s initial training, and involve part-time work in a firm and 
part-time classroom education. Empirical evaluation generally conclude that these contracts 
have no effect on post-training wages.  
In the present paper, we will focus on what can be considered (according for instance, 
to Fougère et al., 2000) as the other most representative French training programme: the 
“qualifying contract” or CQ
1, which we describe in the next section. The impact of this 
programme on wages has not been studied yet, and remains a concern. We try to address this 
issue here, using propensity matching methods on an original dataset, obtained by merging 
two national databases.  
More precisely, we want to compare two different populations:  
(i)  on the one hand, youth who enter the training programme at time t with a certain 
education level, and obtained a higher education level (acknowledged by a formal 
diploma) at the end of the programme, at time t + 1.  
(ii)  on the other, youth who left school at time t with education levels similar to those 
obtained by the participants at the end of the programme, at time t + 1. 
                                                 
1 Abbreviation for the French denomination of the programme: “Contrat de Qualification”.  
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t + 5), we hope to evaluate the effect of participation in a Qualifying Contract on earnings.  
Economic theory provides contrasting insights on what results might be expected: 
human capital theory generally suggests that the returns on education are decreasing with age. 
It may therefore be better – for those individuals with high enough abilities, at least – to 
undergo a longer initial training, to look for a job after completing this initial training, and to 
train less and less as one advances in a career path. If that is true, more educated school 
leavers may be advantaged over participants in a training programme.  
Nevertheless, the same theory also suggests that firms prefer specific rather than 
general human capital. One may expect that the type of human capital acquired during a 
training programme is more specific (to an industry if not to a firm) than the type of human 
capital acquired during initial training. If this assertion holds, then participants in a training 
programme may have an advantage over non-participants, whose education level is at best 
slightly higher, and who have less labour market experience. 
3.  The Qualifying Contract 
The “Qualifying Contract” (hereafter, CQ), was created in 1984 and is addressed to 
individuals aged 16 to 25, who (i) either did not acquire any diploma during their schooling, 
or (ii) acquired a low-level diploma that does not allow them to obtain a job. The objective of 
the CQ is to allow youth to acquire a higher (or more “recognised”) diploma through formal 
training. The duration of the training has to be at least 25% of the duration of the contract, 
which can go from 6 to 24 months.  
The financial advantage for youth is that they are paid a given percentage (which can 
vary from 30% to 75%) of the minimum wage (the SMIC
2), according to their age and tenure 
within the firm. The CQ can be signed with any employer in the private sector. Employers 
who hire a young person on a CQ benefit from an exemption of social security contributions 
for this particular contract. 
The selection process into a CQ in 1998 was as follows: an applicant willing to 
participate in a CQ had to turn to the local employment agency of his area to inform them of 
his/her interest. Employers interested in hiring youth on a CQ did the same thing. It was then 
up to the local employment agencies to do the matching between youth and employers; the 
final decision to accept or reject an application did belong, however, to employers. Lately, 
the role of the agencies has been reduced. In fact, with the development of Internet, their role 
                                                 
2 French acronym for “Salaire Minimum de Croissance”, which could be translated as “growth-compatible 
minimum wage”. 
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and to employers to decide about who they hire. This implies that any “creaming effect” that 
employment agencies may have had on the youth-employers matching process has been 
greatly reduced. 
4.  Econometric analysis 
4.1. Propensity score matching 
The methodology used in this paper is propensity score matching, which allows to 
give a non-parametric estimation of the effect of a “treatment
3” (e.g. participation in a 
training programme) on a continuous variable (such as wages). Economic studies dealing with 
evaluation problems have come to rely increasingly on this methodology in the recent years. 
In this framework, the main problem is that of missing information. Let D be a random 
variable taking two values: 1 if the individual has been treated and 0 if he/she has not. Let X 
be a vector of observed covariates and Y be the outcome variable. In the data, we only 
observe Y1 if the individual has been treated (D=1) and Y0 if he/she has not (D=0).  
Let us now concentrate on the average effect of the treatment on the treated (ATT), 
given by: 
(1)   Δ
TT = E(Y1 - Y0 | X, D=1) = E(Y1 | X, D=1) - E(Y0 | X, D=1)  
The ATT is the expected difference between Y1 and Y0, conditional on D=1. The missing 
information problem clearly concerns E(Y0 | X, D=1): indeed, we never observe Y0 in the data 
when D=1. In other words, we never observe the wage a treated individual would have had 
he/she not been treated. This counterfactual will have to be estimated. In order to do so, it is 
common to use the information given by E(Y0 | X, D=0). However, the use of this information 
without precautions may cause biased estimations of Δ
TT. Hence, it is necessary to guarantee 
that, given X, the treated outcomes would be what the non-treated outcomes are had they not 
been treated. This is called the conditional independence assumption (CIA) and can be written 
as Y0 C D | X.  
This assumption implies that selection occurs only on observables and is eliminated 
when accounting for X. Under the CIA, E(Y0 | X, D=1) = E(Y0 | X, D=0) and thus we can use 
the latter to estimate the counterfactuals. However, as we have to condition on X, the 
dimensionality of the vector of covariates can limit the use of matching. Hence, another 
approach is normally used: following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), if the CIA is valid for X, 
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common function is the propensity score, i.e., the probability of being treated, given X: 
P(X)  =  P(D=1 | X), because it is a one-dimensional function of X. If P(X) <1, then 
E(Y0 | P(X), D=1) = E(Y0 | P(X), D=0) and so the matching between treated and non-treated 
individuals can be done solely on the basis of their propensity scores. 
When matching on propensity scores, some method has to be chosen on how to build 
the control group for each treated individual. Several non-parametric matching algorithms 
exist. In this paper, we use: (i) different nearest-neighbour estimators, which match treated 
observations to the n closest controls (n ≥ 1), and (ii) a kernel estimator, which attributes 
weights to control observations according to their relative proximity to the treated observation, 
the relative proximity being based on the propensity scores P(X). Heckman, Ichimura and 
Todd (1997) have shown that evaluation bias includes the selection bias as such, the bias due 
to non-overlapping supports of X in the two groups and the bias due to different distributions 
of X within the two groups. To avoid the bias due to non-overlapping supports of X, we only 
consider the common support of both distributions. To avoid the bias due to different 
distributions of X within the two groups, we examine whether or not the average absolute 
standardised bias between the treatment and control groups has been reduced after matching. 
4.2. Estimation strategy 
We conducted our analysis in three steps. The first step consisted in estimating the 
propensity score. The propensity score is classically estimated using a binary qualitative-
response model such as Probit or Logit. However, we face in our study a problem which 
cannot be tackled with these usual models: indeed, we observe the net wage in 2003 of both 
participants and non-participants in a CQ. However, some indivuals (both in the treatment and 
control groups) are unemployed in 2003, and therefore do not receive any wage. Rather than 
simply setting the wage to zero, we address this potential selection bias by estimating a 
bivariate Probit model.  
We define two indicators variables yi1 and yi2: 
⎧ yi1 = 1  if individual i is employed in 2003, and 0 otherwise, 
⎩ yi2 = 1  if individual i has participated in a CQ, and 0 otherwise 




i2 such that:  
⎧ yi1 = 1  if y
*
i1 > 0, and 0 otherwise, 
⎩ yi2 = 1  if y
*
i2 > 0, and 0 otherwise. 
                                                                                                                                                          
3 This terminology refers to the first works where this analytical framework was developed: these works where 
concerned with the evaluation of medical treatments. 
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where Xij (j = 1, 2) is a vector of explanatory variables (to be defined in Section 5), βj the 
associated vector of parameters, and εij random error terms that are assumed to be jointly 
normally distributed, with mean 0 and correlation coefficient ρ. The main interest of this 
model for our purpose is that it allows us to estimate the probability the probability of having 
participated in a CQ, given that the individual is observed in employment in 2003. This is 
simply the conditional probability: Pr(CQ | employment) = Pr(yi2 = 1 | yi1 = 1). 
Once the individual propensity scores have been estimated, the second step of the 
analysis consists in matching them. As was said in Point 4.1., we achieved this by using two 
alternative non-parametric matching algorithms: (i) the n nearest-neighbour(s) estimator, 
implemented with three different values of n (n = 1, 5, 10), and (ii) the kernel estimator, using 
the Epanechnikov kernel function (other kernel functions were tested but all yield very similar 
results). We enforced a common support by dropping treated observations for which the 
propensity score was either higher than the maximum or less than the minimum propensity 
score of the control group. 
  Finally, the third step consisted in calculating the ATT, given by: 
(3)   Δ
TT = E(wcq – wc | CQ =1) 
where wcq is the average wage for the treated group, wc the average wage for the matched 
control group, and where CQ=1 means that only participants in a CQ are considered. 
5.  Data 
5.1. Presentation of the databases 
The data used in this paper comes from two separate databases. The first is the so-
called “Panel of Beneficiaries” of active labour market policies and vocational training 2001-
2003, gathered by DARES (Direction for Statictics, Research and Studies, Ministry of Labour 
and Employment, Paris). It was used to build the treatment group. The second is the 
“Generation 1998” database, gathered by Cereq (national Centre for Research and Studies on 
Employment and Skills, based in Marseilles). It was used to build the control group. 
The Panel of Beneficiaries is made of individuals who have participated in one of 
eight labour market programmes, including the CQ programme, on which we focus in this 
study. The data was gathered using a questionnaire survey. The database includes a five-year 
monthly calendar and the detailed description of five labour market situations (employment, 
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is information about: professional background and labour market situations prior to 
participation in the programme; circumstances of entry into the programme; the programme 
per se (tutoring, training, etc.). This is intended to give researchers a clearer vision of the part 
played by the programme in the individual’s career path. The database also gives information 
about the socio-economic environment (type of household, financial resources, wages, etc.) 
and about the role played by local employment agencies in the individual’s career path. 
Additional information on educational attainment, unemployment duration, age, etc., prior to 
participation in a CQ was obtained by merging the panel with administrative databases. 
The population of participants in a CQ programme is made of individuals who left the 
programme in the fourth quarter of 1999. Given that the duration of a CQ can vary from 6 to 
24 months, this means that these individuals entered the programme at one of three possible 
dates: in the fourth quarter of 1997 (programme duration: 24 months), in the fourth quarter of 
1998 (programme duration: 12 months), or in the second quarter of 1999 (programme 
duration: 6 months). For this paper, we only consider those who entered the programme in 
1998, in order to focus on individuals who are more comparable to the control group. 
The Generation 98 database, which we used to build the control group, is a 
representative sample (by gender, diplomas and disciplines) of all individuals who left the 
French education system in 1998 and did not go back to schooling during that year. The data 
was gathered by means of telephone interviews, and there were two rounds of surveys: one in 
2001 and one in 2003. The heart of the database is a monthly calendar covering the 1998-
2003 period and providing information on the labour market situation of each individual (such 
as short-term employment, long-term employment, unemployment, inactivity), as well as on 
his/her wage in case of employment. The Generation 1998 database also provides a wealth of 
informations on individuals’ schooling: type of diploma, discipline, specialization (in case of 
vocational training), etc. Finally, it gives socio-demographic characteristics such as age, 
gender, number of children, region of origin, parents’ education, and parents’ occupation at 
various moments in time. 
The 55345 individuals gathered in the Generation 1998 database make an almost ideal 
control group for our study. Indeed, on the one hand, thanks to the “Panel of Beneficiaries”, 
we have a treatment group made of individuals who enter a CQ in 1998, in order to get a 
(higher) diploma one year later. On the other hand, thanks to the “Generation 1998”, we can 
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4 with comparable diplomas, 
without participating in a CQ. We will now describe in more details how these two groups 
were built. 
5.2. Selection of the treatment and control groups 
The Panel of Beneficiaries contains 1631 individuals who participated in a CQ in 1998. 
Among these individuals, only 1257 remained in the sample for the whole period studied. We 
then had to eliminate those participants who had obtained, at the end of the CQ, a vocational 
diploma acknowledged by employers but with no equivalent in the education system. There 
would indeed be no match for these individuals in the control group. We are therefore left 
with 860 observations for the treatment group. 
As for Generation 98, we started with 55345 observations, but only 22021 individuals 
remain in the sample until to 2003. We eliminated individuals who reported having worked, 
before the end of their schooling period, in the same firm where they were working at the time 
of the survey. We also had to eliminate a few individuals that obtained a diploma through a 
labour market programme, as they would not be good controls for our purposes. This left us 
with 17125 observations. Finally, we eliminated individuals who obtained a diploma with no 
counterpart in the treatment group. In the end, there were 12289 observations left. 
The control group was built in the following way: first, we calculated the distribution 
of diplomas among the treatment group. Second, we did a random draw among the 12289 
remaining observations, using an appropriate stratification in order to replicate in the control 
group the distribution of diplomas observed in the treatment group. However, since the 
distributions of diplomas were not originally the same in both groups, this lead forced us to 
reduce the number of observations used from Generation 1998. In the end, our control group 
had a total of 2401 observations, replicating exactly the distribution of the level of diploma 
for the treatment group. The random draw itself was repeated a hundred times, in order to 
check the stability of the results when the composition of the control group varies.  
The process of the selection of observations for both databases is recapitulated in 
Table 1, whereas Table 2 shows the distribution of diplomas in the control and treatment 
groups after selection. The “baccalaureat”, also known as “Bac” is a diploma that high school 
students receive at the end of their high school training, after passing a national exam. It is 
probably the most important diploma in France, as it gives access to higher education. All 
other diplomas are defined in reference to the Bac. 
                                                 
4 And who, moreover, did not get any further training during that year. 
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Table 1: Selection of observations 
  Treatment group  
(started a CQ in 1998) 
Control group 
Source database:  Panel of Beneficiaries  Generation 1998 
All observations:  1631 55345 
1. Remained in the sample during the 
whole period  1257 22021 
2.a Did not work, during their 
schooling, in the firm where they were 
working at the time of the survey 
2.b. Did not obtained their diploma 
through an ALMP 
— 17125   
Keep if: 
3. Obtained diplomas that can be 
compared between the treatment and 
control groups 
860 12289 
Replication in the controls of the distribution of 
diplomas observed in the treatment group  — 2401 
In the end  860  2401 
Reading: when we keep only those that are in the sample foir the whole period, we have left 1257 observations 
for the CQ. 
 
Table 2: distribution of diplomas in treatment and control groups 
Treatment Control  Diploma 
  Obs. %  Obs.  % 
CAP  
(vocational certification obtained in Junior High School)  58 6.74  162  6.75 
BEP  
(vocational diploma obtained in Junior High School)  39  4.53  109  4.54 
Baccalauréat (a.k.a. “Bac”)  117  13.6  326  13.58 
BTS  
(vocational diploma delivered in High School, 2 years after Bac)  111  12.91 310 12.91 
DUT  
(vocational diploma delivered by Universities, 2 years after Bac)  30  3.49  84  3.5 
Other  training  track  256  29.77 714 29.74 
Dropped out before obtaining CAP or BEP  36  4.19  101  4.21 
Dropped out before Baccalauréat 62  7.21  173  7.21 
Dropped out before completion of BTS or DUT  63  7.33  176  7.33 
Dropped out before completion of other training track  88  10.23  246  10.25 
Total 860  100  2401  100 
 
After selecting the treatment and control groups, we kept only variables that were 
observed in both groups. Most of these variables were qualitative in the treatment group, and 
had to be recoded in the same way in the control groups. Table 3 presents some summary 
statistics for the main variables used in the estimation of the propensity score and ATT. The 
net wage is the continuous outcome variable on which we want to measure the ATT. The 
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Probit estimation that we use to compute the propensity score (cf. previous section). 
Table 3: summary statistics 
CQ Control  group  Variable 
Mean Std.  Dev. Mean Std.  Dev.
Net monthly wage in 2003 (in euros)  1320.42 (469.44) 1215.54 (431.22)
Employed in 2003 (1 if yes, 0 otherwise)  0.87 (0.33) 0.80 (0.40) 
Less than 20 years old in 1998 (1 if yes, 0 otherwise)  0.11 (0.31) 0.24 (0.43) 
Gender (1 if male, 0 if female)  0.56 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50) 
Initial training related to:      
  - Agriculture (1 if yes, 0 otherwise)  0.05 (0.21) 0.10 (0.30) 
  - Manufacture (1 if yes, 0 otherwise)  0.19 (0.40) 0.17 (0.38) 
  - Services  (1 if yes, 0 otherwise)  0.41 (0.49) 0.30 (0.46) 
  - Other / general (1 if yes, 0 otherwise)  0.35  (0.48)  0.43  (0.50) 
Father’s situation at the end of individual’s initial training:      
  - Unemployed (1 if yes, 0 otherwise)  0.03 (0.18) 0.03 (0.17) 
  - Retired (1 if yes, 0 otherwise)  0.11 (0.31) 0.07 (0.25) 
Children (1 if individual has children, 0 otherwise)  0.02  (0.15)  0.02  (0.13) 
Unemployment duration before 4
th quarter of 1998:      
  - 0 month (1 if yes, 0 otherwise)  0.94 (0.24) 0.45 (0.50) 
  - less than 12 months (1 if yes, 0 otherwise)   0.02 (0.15) 0.04 (0.19) 
  - 12 months or more (1 if yes, 0 otherwise)  0.04  (0.19)  0.51  (0.50) 
Nature of benefits received at the begining of this period 
(if unemployed before 4
th quarter of 1998):      
  - unemployment benefits  0.07  (0.26)  0.03  (0.16) 
  - housing allowance  0.04  (0.20)  0.02  (0.15) 
  - family allowance  0.01  (0.10)  0.02  (0.13) 
  - basic income  0.01  (0.08)  0.005  (0.07) 
  - internship compensation  0.02  (0.14)  0.004  (0.06) 
  - other allowance  0.005  (0.07)  0.00  (0.00) 
Number of observations  860  2401 
Reading: 11% of CQ participants are less than 20 years old. 
 
Table 3 shows that participants in a CQ programme in 1998 tend to be older than the 
controls. Men are slightly more represented in the treatment group. Moreover, the initial 
training of participants in a CQ was more often than not vocational, with a strong orientation 
towards services. Most participants in the CQ programme did not experience any 
unemployment spell during the year when they entered the programme (which seems 
reasonable, due to the fact that most of them spent most of the year in the programme). By 
contrast, 51% of the control group experience a 12-months-long unemployment spell, which 
means that they were unemployed during the whole year. Given that many of these 
individuals left school with low-level diplomas, this is not surprising: it is quite common in 
France to observe a period of unemployment of one year or more starting at the end of the 
initial training period (see for instance Fougère et al., 2000; Bonnal et al., 2004). In other 
respects (father’s occupation, children), treated individuals and controls seem quite similar. 
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6.1. Estimation of the propensity score 
As explained in Section 4, the first step of our analysis consisted in estimating the 
propensity score as the probability of having participated in a CQ (conditional on being 
employed in 2003) using a bivariate Probit model. The results of this estimation are presented 
in Table 4. The probability to be employed in 2003 is influenced by a few variables only: 
males have a higher probability to be employed than females. On the contrary, younger 
individuals, as well as those who received a general training and experienced an employment 
spell with family allowance in 1998, have a lower probability to be employed in 2003. 
Table 4: bivariate probit estimates 
Variables   
Probability of 
employment in 2003 
Probability of 
participation in CQ 
   Coeff. Std. Dev.  Coeff.  Std. Dev. 
Less than 20 years old in 1998     -0.32 (0.06)*** -0.56  (0.08)*** 
Male   0.29 (0.06)*** 0.29  (0.06)*** 
Initial training related to:  Agriculture  0.03 (0.11) -0.53  (0.12)*** 
(ref. : Services)  Manufacture  0.09 (0.09) -0.25  (0.09)*** 
  General / Other  -0.13 (0.06)** -0.37  (0.06)*** 
Unemployed father     -0.28 (0.14)* 0.18  (0.15) 
Retired father    -0.08 (0.10) 0.25  (0.10)** 
Children (ref.: no)  yes  -0.38 (0.20)* 0.42  (0.22)* 
Unemployment spells in 1998  < 12 months  0.01 (0.15) -0.74  (0.15)*** 
(ref: 0 month)  ≥ 12 months  0.11 (0.06)* -1.78  (0.08)*** 
Benefits if unemployed  unemployment benefits  -0.02 (0.14) 0.33  (0.12)*** 
(ref. : no benefits or allowance)  housing allowance  -0.15 (0.16) 0.03  (0.15) 
   family allowance  -0.56 (0.23)** -0.81  (0.26)*** 
   basic income  -0.55 (0.32)* -0.15  (0.32) 
   internship compensation 0.29 (0.32) 0.89  (0.26)*** 
   other allowance  -1.22 (0.64)*     
Constant   0.90 (0.06)*** -0.05  (0.05) 
Correlation coefficient of error terms ρ  0.17 (0.04)*** 
Log likelihood  -2847.48 
Wald test of H0 : “βj = 0” 
Wald Chi²: 697.05  d.f.: 31  p-value: 0.000  H0 rejected at the 1% 
level 
* significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level 
NB: the “other allowance” binary variable was not included in the CQ equation, because it is always equal to 0 
when in the control group (i.e. when CQ=0) 
 
A large number of variables explain the probability to participate in a CQ programme: 
males who, in 1998, experienced an unemployment spell with either unemployment benefits 
or internship compensation are more likely to enter a CQ programme. This suggests that firms 
that propose to hire young people on a CQ select them on the basis of their previous labour 
market experience. Indeed, an unemployed individual cannot receive unemployment benefits 
if he/she has not worked for at least 2 months in a row. Similarly, receiving an internship 
compensation means that the individual did an internship or apprenticeship before being 
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probability to be hired on a CQ. 
On the contrary, younger individuals, with an initial training oriented towards 
anything but services, have a lower probability of being hired on a CQ. Experiencing (short or 
long) unemployment spells before the end of 1998 decreases the probability to participate in a 
CQ. Moreover, individuals who were unemployed before the end of 1998, and who received 
family allowances during this period of unemployment, are also less likely to participate in 
the programme. In a nutshell, participation in a CQ programme in 1998 seems to be mostly 
conditioned on previous labour market situations, and more precisely on unemployment and 
previous work experience. 
6.2. Estimation of the ATT 
After computing the propensity score, we proceeded with propensity score matching 
and estimated the ATT, as explained in Section 4.  The results of the estimation of the ATT 
are given in Table 5, which presents the value of the ATT before matching (i.e. the difference 
between the average wage for both groups), and for each of the matching algorithms that we 
implemented. The unmatched estimator shows a strongly significant positive difference 
between the treatment and control groups, in favour of the treated. After matching, this 
positive difference remains significant in 3 cases out of 4: only with the simple nearest 
neighbour matching estimator does the difference between treated and controls become non-
significant. According to the other three estimators (5-nearest neighbours, 10-nearest 
neighbours, and Epanechnikov kernel), participation in a CQ programme yields a significant 
wage premium 5 years later. The magnitude of this premium varies from roughly 79 euros 
(according to the kernel estimator) to 204 euros (according to the 5-nearest neighbour 
estimator). 
Table 5: estimation of ATT based on propensity scores matching 
Method  ATT on net wage in 2003 
  ATT estimate  Standard Deviation  Student T 
Before matching (unmatched)  103.48*** (20.74)  4.99 
Nearest neighbour  128.04  121.48  1.05 
5 nearest neighbours  204.08*** 58.36  3.50 
10 nearest neighbours  95.65** 45.64  2.10 
Kernel 78.69*** (25.20)  3.12 
* significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level 
 
 
Before commenting on these results, it is necessary to examine the performance of the 
estimation. First, we observed that, whatever the matching method we used, there were 
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in the control group on the basis of their propensity scores). Therefore, we should not fear 
biases arising from non-overlapping supports of observables in the treatment and control 
groups. 
Second, we tried to assess the performance of each match by examining the reduction 
of the average absolute standardised bias, before and after matching. The average absolute 
standardised bias is formally defined as the difference between sample means in the treatment 
and control groups as a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample variances in 
both groups. Table 6 shows that each estimator performed rather well, as there has been a 
reduction in bias after matching – which means that we are comparing distributions that are 
more similar after matching than before.  
Although there is no benchmarking for this bias, comparing these values to those 
obtained in other studies (e.g. Bryson et al. 2002; Vandenberghe and Robin, 2004) suggests a 
performance of the match. The simple nearest neighbour and the Epanechnikov kernel 
estimators seem to have performed better than the other estimators. Overall, we should not 
fear biases arising from different distributions of observables in both groups. 
Table 6: Performance of match (reduction of average absolute standardised bias) 
Average absolute standardised bias  Methods 
Before matching  After matching 
% reduced bias 
Nearest neighbour  19.71  2.57  87.0 
5 nearest neighbours  19.71  3.19  83.8 
10 nearest neighbours  19.71  3.89  80.3 
Kernel 19.71  2.87  85.4 
  
Finally, estimations performed with other randomly-drawn control groups (as 
explained in Section 5) have yielded results that are very similar to those presented here. 
Overall, the effects of participation in a CQ programme on earnings thus seem consistent and 
stable
5. The reader should keep in mind that we observe individuals who entered this 
programme in 1998 with a certain education level, and got a higher education level at the end 
of the programme, in 1999. These participants are compared to individuals who left school in 
1998 with education levels similar to those obtained by the participants at the end of the CQ. 
Our results therefore suggest that participants who enrol in a CQ programme can expect, 5 
                                                 
5 Alternatively, we estimated the propensity score using a simple Probit to estimate the probability of participation in 
a CQ, and setting the wage to zero for unemployed individuals in 2003. This more conservative methodology yielded 
similar results: all matching estimators showed a significantly positive ATT. The only difference with this approach 
was, unsurprinsgly, that the unmateched estimator was negative. 
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level of education. 
From a theoretical perspective, this may suggest that firms reward human capital 
acquired during on-the-job-training more than human capital acquired during initial schooling. 
This may be because the former is more specific (maybe not to a given firm, but at least to an 
industry) than the latter. Moreover, from the firm viewpoint, the CQ training programme may 
be seen not only as a period of human capital acquisition by the trainee, but also as a trial 
period, as in job-matching theory: at the end of this period (which can last from 6 to 24 
months), the firm can decide either to break the match or to make more permanent (by hiring 
the trainee on a more conventional labour contract, for instance).  
In a more empirical perspective, our results may give some insight in the type of 
education valued by firms: it seem indeed that, if education matters, it matters more when 
combined with some degree of labour market experience. Firms prefer to hire young persons 
with a lower education level (but some degree of labour market experience) and train them 
themselves, than to hire inexperienced youth with a slightly higher education level. 
7.  Conclusion 
The objective of this paper was to evaluate the impact of the “Qualifying Contract” on 
earnings. The Qualifying Contract is a training programme for youth widely used in France. 
Its purpose is to allow youth to acquire additional labour market experience and education, 
and to validate this experience and education by granting a formal diploma (equivalent to 
those that can be obtained through initial schooling). The participant therefore “qualifies for” 
a formal diploma (hence the denomination of the contract). However, this diploma may or 
may not have the same effect on post-training wages as a similar diploma acquired through 
initial schooling. 
In order to answer this question, we observe the 2003 net wages of a group of 
participants enrolled in a Qualifying Contract in 1998 (the “treatment” group). Using 
propensity score matching, we contrast these wages to the 2003 net wages of a control group 
made of individuals who completed their initial training in 1998 with diplomas similar to 
those obtained by the treated at the end of the programme. In order to control for selection 
biases arising from the fact that some individuals (participants and non-participants alike) 
may be unemployed in 2003, we estimated the propensity score using a bivariate Probit model. 
We estimated the average effect of the treatment on the treated using various non-
parametric matching algorithms. All algorithms but one (the simple nearest neighbour) show 
a significantly positive effect of the treatment on the treated. In other words, participants in 
  - 15 - the programme benefit, five years after participation, from a positive wage premium going 
from 80 to 200 euros (depending on which estimator is used). This suggests that firms do not 
simply value education: if education matters, then it matters even more when it is coupled 
with practical labour market experience. 
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